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Deliberation and global civil society: agency,
arena, aﬀect
JAMES BRASSETT AND WILLIAM SMITH
Abstract. The article provides a critical analysis of the role and function of global civil
society within deliberative approaches to global governance. It critiques a common view that
global civil society can/should act as an agent for democratising global governance and seeks
to explore the importance of global civil society as an arena of deliberation. This more
reconstructive aim is supplemented by an empirically focused discussion of the aﬀective
dimensions of global civil society, in general, and the increasingly important use of film, in
particular. Ultimately, this then yields an image of the deliberative politics of global civil
society that is more reflective of the diﬀerences, ambiguities and contests that pervade its
discourses about global governance. This is presented as a quality that debates about
deliberative global governance might learn from as well as speak to.
Introduction
Deliberative theorists look to global civil society as an agent for reforming and
democratising global governance.1 Some charge it with fostering a democratic
public sphere, others seek to ‘open up’ international organisations to wider forms
of public reason-giving, while others task global civil society with democratising
discourses of globalisation and global governance.2 Across these positions an
expectation can be discerned that – at its best – global civil society can be a
champion of deliberative values and egalitarian norms at the global level.
The aim of this article is to contribute to these ongoing eﬀorts to locate global
civil society within a deliberative account of global governance. Our contribution
begins with an analysis of what we see as a tempting, but ultimately unsatisfying,
means of conceptualising the deliberative qualities of global civil society. Global
civil society, according to this perspective, is understood primarily as a deliberative
agent, capable of exercising a decisive and positive influence on the decisions,
institutional structures and discursive contexts of global governance. Our concern
is that, insofar as global civil society is conceptualised this way, deliberative
theorists may – despite their avowed intentions – downplay profound disagreement
1 Deliberative approaches are normative accounts of global governance that seek to maximise the
influence of reason in global or transnational decision-making. See William Smith and James
Brassett, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance: Liberal, Cosmopolitan and Critical Perspectives’,
Ethics & International Aﬀairs, 22:1 (2008), pp. 67–90, for a fuller discussion.
2 In particular, see James Bohman, Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to Demoi, (Cambridge,
Mass., The MIT Press, 2007) and John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and
Democracy in a Divided World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
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within global civil society over the legitimacy of global institutions, the nature of
global capitalism, and questions of political strategy.3 In addition, a pronounced
focus on agency may – again notwithstanding their professed aims – lead
deliberative theorists to overplay the current capacity of global civil society to
promote a broadly egalitarian agenda in global or transnational contexts.4
This critical analysis forms the basis of our more constructive agenda: to
develop an alternative conceptual framework for understanding the deliberative
nature and ethical limits of global civil society. Global civil society should, we
argue, be defined not only as a deliberative agent, but also as an aﬀective arena,
a space for critical reflection and aﬀective expression. This move allows us to focus
on the critical and ethical content of deliberation that takes place within global
civil society, revealing the diﬀerences, dilemmas, ambiguities and contests that
pervade its discourses about global governance. Our analysis suggests that we
should exercise caution in characterising global civil society as an agent of
deliberative reform, but, at the same time, oﬀers support for the view that it can
be a fertile source of new ideas and challenges relating to global governance. A
focus on global civil society as an arena also allows us to explore the co-existence
of reason-giving and aﬀect in its communicative processes. The emotional impact
of verbal and non-verbal campaigning – pictorial, musical, narrative, and the
like – is becoming central to the substantive politics of global civil society, reflected
in the extensive use of music, comedy and film in the recent Make Poverty History
campaign.5 This aﬀective dimension highlights the impact that deliberation has not
only on institutional decision-making but also on the self-understanding of global
civil society and its audiences.
The argument is developed over three sections. The first section explores the
interpretation of global civil society to be found in the work of John Dryzek and
James Bohman. Although their endeavours yield contrasting theoretical frame-
works, both conceptualise global civil society as an important agent in deliberative
global governance. The second section develops a constructive critique of this view,
focusing specifically on the danger that it understates the diversity of global civil
society and overstates its egalitarian potential. Global civil society is, we argue,
home to both reformist arguments for accountability and transparency and to
3 We stress the word ‘downplay’, so as not to imply ‘ignore’ or ‘deny’. It would misrepresent the
arguments of the deliberative theorists that we examine in this article to suggest that they do not
attach strong value to the plurality and multi-perspectival nature of global civil society. Bohman and
Dryzek both draw attention to the capacity for critical reflexivity implied by such pluralism. In what
follows, we consider whether their theories employ the best conceptual tools for addressing or
engaging with the ambiguities of civil society.
4 We stress the word ‘overplay’, so as not to imply ‘assert’ or ‘aﬃrm’. Again, it would be ungenerous
and inaccurate to contend that deliberative theorists develop naïve or uncritical accounts of global
civil society. According to Bohman, ‘practices of empowerment by NGOs may have paradoxes built
into them, such as when less well oﬀ civil society organizations become accountable to better-oﬀ
organizations in exchange for resources and assistance’ (Bohman, Democracy Across Borders, p. 70).
And Dryzek suggests ‘one should treat with great caution any connotations of virtuous civil society
activists confronting and eventually transforming established relations of power in the international
system’ (Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics, p. 123). Bohman and Dryzek are acutely aware of the
ethical and political deficiencies of global civil society, relating to inequalities of resources between
groups, power hierarchies within and between organisations and the potential for co-optation by
particular interests.
5 James Brassett, ‘Cosmopolitanism vs. Terrorism? Discourses of Ethical Possibility Before, and After
7/7, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 36:2 (2008), pp. 121–47.
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ostensibly more radical arguments for de-globalisation and/or anarchy. It is unclear
that these arguments can be reconciled, in even a modest way, by encouraging
greater deliberation with or within the institutions of global governance. In light of
such considerations, the idea of an aﬀective arena is oﬀered as a more promising
way of situating global civil society within a broader account of deliberative global
governance. The third section demonstrates the potential fruits of this move by
discussing the current use of film in global civil society, particularly its role in
stimulating debate and discussion about the ethics of global trade. The aim of this
case-study is to illustrate our general observations about the nature and limits of
deliberation within global civil society and the diverse aims and eﬀects it can have.
1. Globalising deliberation? The centrality of civil society
Deliberative approaches to global governance, particularly those that emphasise
the role of global civil society, are influenced heavily by Jurgen Habermas’s
democratic theory.6 Habermas calls for healthy flows of communication between
formal decision-making bodies and the associations and networks of civil society.7
Civil society is tasked with discovering new social problems and placing them on
the agenda for democratic deliberation. It must influence, or ‘steer’, formal
decision-making and protect the communicative infrastructure of deliberative
democracy.8 Advocates of global deliberative democracy, notably James Bohman
and John Dryzek, hope that civil society organisations can perform essentially the
same role beyond the borders of the nation-state.
Bohman proceeds from a critique of what he sees as Habermas’s state-centric
conception of democracy. According to Bohman, Habermas makes the conceptual
mistake of describing democracy as a process of self-determination by a singular
‘dêmos’. This is why Habermas remains committed to the idea that deliberative
democracy must be embedded within a shared cultural horizon.9 The conceptual
connection between democracy and dêmos, argues Bohman, prematurely limits
aspirations to democratise global governance given the absence of anything like a
global democratic subject.10 Against this view, he claims that the singular
democratic subject must be radically de-centred: ‘democracy needs to be re-thought
in the plural, as the rule of demoi’.11 He rejects self-determination by a singular
dêmos as the normative core of democracy and replaces it with the idea of
governance in and across multiple units, such as cities, states, and global
institutions.12 This conceptual move allows Bohman to sidestep the restrictions
imposed by the assumption that democracy requires a common identity or
6 Molly Cochran, ‘A Democratic Critique of Cosmopolitan Democracy: Pragmatism from the
Bottom-Up’, European Journal of International Relations, 8:4 (2002), p. 530.
7 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), chs. 7–8.
8 William Smith, ‘Civil Disobedience and Social Power: Reflections on Habermas’, Contemporary
Political Theory, 7:1 (2008), pp. 73–6.
9 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 487.
10 Bohman, Democracy Across Borders, pp. 39–40.
11 Ibid., p. vii.
12 Ibid., p. 33.
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receptive cultural environment.13 Instead, democracy requires guaranteeing for all
persons meaningful opportunities to form and revise the terms of their common life
and the institutional framework(s) that govern them.14
The central task of democratic reform, according to Bohman, is to gain a
‘practical foothold’ in order to subject previously technocratic and elitist govern-
ance mechanisms to principles of political equality and non-domination.15 This
does not entail the impossible and, perhaps, undesirable stipulation that everyone
should have a say in every decision, but it does require that, at a minimum, people
should have a reasonable expectation that the kinds of reasons they would assent
to are represented in political decisions that aﬀect them.16 According to Bohman,
‘the reasonable expectation that I may influence a decision-making process that is
responsive to reasons and the discipline of reasons is suﬃcient for a minimal
criterion of freedom as “non-domination.”’17 The problem with the contemporary
regime of global governance, he argues, is that it all too frequently violates this
criterion.
In order to enhance the deliberative credentials of global governance, Bohman
contends that it is necessary to open, through contest and engagement, an
intersection between global civil society and international regimes by creating more
or less democratic public spheres:
The greatest impetus for more democracy in the international arena lies in a vigorous civil
society containing oppositional public spheres in which actors organize against the state or
appeal to it when making violations of agreements public. As various international
institutions emerge, they, too, can become the focus of a critical public sphere as actors in
transnational civil society expand and maintain their public interaction across various
political cultural and functional boundaries.18
The public sphere refers to the public forum within which actors deliberate and
discuss pressing social and political issues.19 Bohman aims to open up global
economic governance by building public spheres out of the interactions between
civil society and institutions. If institutions or regimes exist and have a distributive
impact which stretches across borders, then their actions should be shaped by the
opinions of their constituents. Bypassing the thorny issue of world government,
Bohman stresses the contingent, located and experimental nature of evolving public
spheres and highlights the potential of a vibrant civil society to ensure that
appropriate ‘reasons’ can be publicised to larger and larger audiences.20
A similar idea animates the work of Dryzek who, like Bohman, complains that
Habermas establishes too close a connection between the public sphere and the
nation-state.21 He also rejects the view that the normative core of democracy is
self-determination by a singular demos. The value of democracy for Dryzek resides
13 Ibid., p. 36.
14 Ibid., pp. 45–55.
15 James Bohman, ‘International Regimes and Democratic Governance: Political Equality and
Influence in Global Institutions’, International Aﬀairs, 75:3 (1999), p. 500.
16 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997).
17 Bohman, ‘International Regimes and Democratic Governance’, p. 504.
18 Ibid., pp. 506–7.
19 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 360.
20 Bohman, ‘International Regimes and Democratic Governance’, p. 506.
21 Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics, p. 24.
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less in the idea that free and fair elections reveal some kind of general democratic
‘will’ and more in the character of political interaction between citizens that
democracy facilitates. ‘Democracy is about communication as well as voting, about
social learning as well as decision-making’, he says, ‘and it is the communicative
aspect that for the moment can most straightforwardly be pursued in the
international system’.22 Democratic deliberation must provide opportunities for
participation by those aﬀected.23 It must also instantiate a ‘reflexive’ process that,
according to Dryzek, ‘consists in part of the capacity to call into question
traditions and discourses’.24 He agrees with Bohman that citizens should be able
to revise the principles that regulate their social relations through engaging in
public deliberation.
The approach defended by Dryzek diﬀers from Bohman’s less in its normative
basis and more in its account of how deliberative democratic politics should
operate at the global level. Bohman focuses on the emergence of international
public spheres that mediate between institutions of global governance and the
human populations that they govern. This thematic is also alluded to by Dryzek,
when he celebrates ‘the potential for diﬀuse communication in the public sphere
that generates public opinion that can in turn exercise political influence.’25 At
the same time, his account develops a distinctive account of the role that
‘discourses’ – like ‘market liberalism’ or the ‘War on Terror’ – play in democratic
politics.26
The aim of transnational democracy, for Dryzek, is to achieve a ‘communica-
tively competent decentralised control over the content and relative weight of
globally consequential discourses.’27 The institutional matrix of global deliberative
democracy is viewed by Dryzek as less important than the discursive environment
within which institutions operate.28 In part this is because – in contrast to
Bohman’s apparently more optimistic view – Dryzek appears to view political
institutions of any kind as potentially anti-democratic, due to their hierarchical
organisation and the structural limitations on their actions imposed by capital.29 At
the same time, he sees far greater potential for authentic democracy – participation
and reflexive deliberation – in the oppositional activism of global civil society than
in formal institutional settings:
This uneven distribution of the capacity to act reflexively, biased it seems in favour of civil
society actors who are disadvantaged when it comes to more conventional sources of
political power, has important implications for the wellsprings of transnational democracy.
If transnational democracy requires decentralized power in the hands of reflexive actors
then civil society actors should be central.30
22 Ibid., p. 25.
23 Ibid., p. 27.
24 Ibid., p. 144.
25 Ibid., p. 27.
26 A discourse is defined by Dryzek as ‘a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provide its
adherents with a framework for making sense of situations, embodying judgements, assumptions,
capabilities, dispositions, and intentions’ (ibid., p. 1).
27 Ibid., p. 154.
28 Ibid., pp. 160–1.
29 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), p. 93. Cf. Bohman, Democracy Across Borders, pp. 42–4.
30 Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics, p. 123.
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Civil society actors who contest the terms of global governance should not actively
seek entry to sites of collective decision making. This is because within such sites,
deliberative practices are often overwhelmed by the competition to win control
over decision making; genuine deliberation is more likely to take place over longer
periods of time in informal sites, where the costs of moderation and changing
positions are less high.31 Civil society actors should focus on educating publics
about the nature and terms of dominant discourses, revealing their contingent and
changeable nature, and encouraging a process of critical reflection on their
adequacy and acceptability.
A motif that runs throughout these theories is that both endorse something like
Habermas’s account of the function of civil society in deliberative democracy. As
we will discuss in more detail below, the vocation of civil society is to influence
formal decision-making bodies, either through direct institutional input or through
shaping the terms of public debate. This is true even of Dryzek’s approach,
notwithstanding his scepticism about formal institutions as a site of deliberative
reflexivity.32 In addition, Dryzek and Bohman both suggest that global civil society
should orientate its activity around the broadly egalitarian aims of combating
illegitimate power and giving voice to those governed by global power. This is
made explicit by Bohman, when he praises civil society insofar as it advances the
aim of non-domination and criticizes it to the extent that it does not.33 It is also
discernable in Dryzek’s theory, in his requirement that global civil society must
promote a specific type of communication, which, as he puts it, is ‘first, capable of
inducing reflection, second, non-coercive, and, third, capable of linking the
particular experience of an individual or group with some more general point or
principle’.34
2. From deliberative agent to aﬀective arena
The dominant theme which emerges is the importance of the role of global civil
society as an ‘agent’ in global deliberation. By ‘agent’, we mean an actor, or set
of actors, ascribed important functions within a broadly normative account of
deliberative global governance. Bohman, for instance, values global civil society
when it makes institutions more responsive to public reasons or fosters public
spheres. Dryzek values global civil society when it promotes a globally consequen-
tial discourse or impacts on the conflict of discourses in a broadly reflexive fashion.
Such an avowedly instrumental approach to global civil society, we suggest, risks
reducing its ambiguity and complexity in the name of theoretical or political
imperatives. And, as we argue below, this in turn can compromise some of the
more ambitious claims that are made on behalf of the capacity of civil society to
promote egalitarian norms.
31 Ibid., pp. 54–8.
32 Ibid., pp. 61–4.
33 Bohman, Democracy Across Borders, pp. 65–6.
34 Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics, p. 52. For further discussion of this feature of Dryek’s view, see
Smith & Brassett, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance’, pp. 87–8.
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The ambiguity of global civil society
The tendency to downplay the ambiguity of global civil society emerges in the
aspirations that deliberative theorists hold for it as an agent that can influence the
debates and decisions of global governance institutions. Global civil society is
described as a solution, or part of a solution, to the problem of how these
institutions can be made more receptive to the citizens whose lives they aﬀect. This
characterisation of global civil society as an agent that can have a meaningful
impact on the world is unobjectionable in itself and, indeed, important. There is a
risk, however, that deliberative approaches end up doing what they set out to
avoid, namely: to make a fetish of decision-making in global governance, rather
than engage with, understand and learn from actual deliberations within global
civil society.
This danger, surprisingly given his anti-institutionalism, is apparent in Dryzek’s
approach. In his writings, he oﬀers many examples, drawn from recent political
practice and involving civil society actors, which illustrate his hopes for deliberative
global politics. These examples, however, often arrive after the fact – after the
politics of global civil society has been conducted – to provide a rationalisation of
how civil society has apparently done what he hopes it can, namely contest or
advance a discourse. For instance, he looks at how NGOs have created a ‘counter
discourse’ to market liberalism which ‘eventually made its presence felt in the
deliberations of international economic institutions’:
Protests against the world economic order, beginning in Seattle in 1999, initially baﬄed
observers attuned not just to the benefits of this order, but also to conventional ways of
thinking about political movements. [. . .] These protests were struggles over meaning: to
challenge the assumption that global economic growth can be equated with progress, to
attach negative connotation to brands such as Nike and McDonalds, and so open space for
recognition of varieties of local struggles against international economic regimes.35
He notes with enthusiasm that ‘eventually the protestors were joined by Stiglitz’,
who stated that ‘the protests have made government oﬃcials and economists
around the world think about alternatives to the Washington Consensus policies as
the one true way for growth and development’.36
This account argues, with some justification, that Seattle was a turning point in
the discourse of global market liberalism, but the multiple perspectives that were
actually generated by the protest movement, although alluded to by Dryzek, are
ultimately downplayed in this narrative. Certainly it is important that Seattle (and
many other moments in the history of alter-globalisation) ‘open[ed] space for
recognition of varieties of local struggles against international economic regimes’.
But this recognition invites, and perhaps requires, a deeper theoretical and
empirical analysis of these local struggles. This analysis is surely compatible with
Dryzek’s broader theoretical framework, but his own interpretation of Seattle does
not engage with the politics, disagreements, practical diﬃculties, ambiguities or
fissures of the process he celebrates.37 For example, the inclusion of speakers like
35 Ibid., p. 10 (emphasis added).
36 Ibid., 124.
37 His analysis of the alter-globalisation movement arguably does not match the complexity of his
earlier assessments of environmental movements and their competing discourses (see John S. Dryzek,
The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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Joseph Stiglitz in the World Social Forum was regarded as highly controversial by
many activists, and the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ that emerged was widely seen
as a rhetorical legitimisation of ‘business as usual’ for neoliberal global govern-
ance.38 The irony is that Dryzek establishes a powerful and avowedly multi-
perspectival conception of global civil society – a decentralised network with no
common agenda – only to value it for having a singular ‘impact’ on the singular
global discourse of market liberalism.
Why might this be a problem for theories of deliberative global governance?
Why can’t they simply do both: first celebrate plurality and second celebrate
impact? To an extent, we believe that they can; indeed, deliberative theorists are
establishing a rich and robust set of arguments on the back of such a ‘dual track’
approach. But we believe it is also necessary to go a step further and ask what is
at stake in the pluralism of global civil society beyond its capacity to influence the
decisions or contexts of global governance? Is the substantive content of the
ongoing discussions in global civil society ethically or politically significant on its
own terms?
In addressing these questions, suggestive connections can be established
between theories of deliberative global governance and the vast and growing
literature on the ethical politics of global civil society.39 A question raised by some
contributors to this literature is whether the ambiguity of global civil society has
value, per se, irrespective of whether it has a specific impact on global govern-
ance?40 As Louise Amoore and Paul Langley suggest, ‘[. . .] within a named and
assumed civil society grouping there are tensions surrounding “who” is being
empowered, or “what” is being resisted [. . .] to deny these tensions in a search for
a single galvanising manifesto or agenda is to miss the very heart of the politics of
transformation.’41 Similarly, Marieke De Goede argues that:
[. . .] in their drive to detect a common programme behind the many possible acts and
movements of resistance, theorists of civil society may erase the ambiguities and
contradictions inherent in the contemporary politics of dissent [. . .] it is easily assumed for
example that the manifold movements protesting in Seattle have a commonality.42
She cites Amoore and Langley in asking how we should think about the individual
who is simultaneously a member of Amnesty International and a portfolio investor
38 See Richard Higgott, ‘Contested Globalization: the Changing Context and Normative Challenges’,
Review of International Studies, 26:5 (2000), pp. 131–54.
39 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on
Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); R. Cox, ‘Civil society at the turn of the
Millennium: prospects for an alternative world order’, in Review of International Studies, 25:1 (1999),
pp. 3–28; J. A. Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance’,
Government and Opposition, 39:2 (Spring 2004), pp. 211–33; G. Baker, ‘Problems in the Theorisation
of Global Civil Society’, in Political Studies, 50:5 (2002), pp. 928–43.
40 L. Amoore, and P. Langley, ‘Ambiguities of Global Civil Society’, Review of International Studies,
30:1 (2004), pp. 105–6; J. Bartelson, ‘Making Sense of Global Civil Society’, in European Journal of
International Relations, 12:3 (2006), pp. 371–95; M. De Goede, ‘Carnival of Money: Politics of
dissent in an era of globalizing finance’, in L. Amoore (ed.), The Global Resistance Reader (London:
Routledge, 2003), pp. 379–91.
41 Amoore and Langley, ‘Ambiguities of Global Civil Society’, pp. 105–6.
42 Marieke De Goede, ‘Carnival of Money: Politics of dissent in an era of globalizing finance’, in
Louise Amoore (ed.), The Global Resistance Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2005),
p. 380.
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in Multi National Corporations, or the protestor in Seattle who was filmed kicking
a Nike sign while wearing Nike shoes.
The point of these observations is not to take easy pot-shots at activists, but
to caution against a temptation to reduce the diversity and ambivalence to be
found in global civil society. De Goede argues that there is a political point behind
this injunction:
Dissolving the contradictions and ambiguities of global protest is not just a conceptual
weakness of global civil society theory, but it is politically problematic. Mostly, finding
commonalities in diverse movements and practices of opposition is held out as the road to
political strength. However, eliminating ambiguity in favour of unity can also be interpreted
as political weakness [. . .] reducing the multiplicity of possible refusals and resistances to a
single force or movement can be seen as an exclusionary political project in itself [. . .]43
Characterising global civil society as an agent which can be valued in terms of a
singular impact on global governance may run the risk of claiming to represent
people who are not suﬃciently included in the discussion. For each activist who
thinks that the WTO should be democratised and reformed to take account of
environmental concerns, for instance one can find (many) others who think that
the WTO should be collapsed, that global trade should be understood as a social
structure that by definition harms the environment, and that we need to
fundamentally re-think the entire logic of global capitalism.44 The tendency to
analyse global civil society solely in terms of its impact on global governance
institutions may therefore obscure the range of discussion and opinion that can be
found within this realm.
The ethics of global civil society
This diversity and disagreement within global civil society poses further challenges
for deliberative theory. The long-term goal of global civil society must be to forge
transnational or global publics, communities of interest that can make their voices
heard in global governance. Given the range of disagreement about political aims
and strategies within global civil society, it is not clear that deliberative theorists
provide us with a convincing account of how it can perform this function. In
particular, in order to make good their claims about the role of civil society in
global governance, deliberative theorists need to provide a richer account of the
processes and dynamics through which civil society organisations promote egali-
tarian norms in the absence of pre-existing solidarity ties.
The diﬃculties that emerge in the absence of such an account can be seen in
relation to the anticipated formation of transnational public spheres. Bohman
identifies three necessary features of public spheres. First, the public sphere is a
forum within which participants identify themselves as a public and engage in the
give and take of reasons. Second, participants in the public sphere must manifest
43 Ibid.
44 These kinds of divergences in the arguments for the reform of globalisation are neatly captured by
Walden Bello’s opposition between the ‘Back to Bretton woods gang’ and the proponents of
‘de-globalization’. Within global civil society it might be useful for illustrative purposes to consider
the alternative objectives of reformist NGOs like War on Want and decentralised, ‘anarchist’
organisations like ‘CIRCA-the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army’, {http://www.clownarmy.
org/}.
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a commitment to freedom and equality. Third, deliberation in the public sphere
must address an indefinite audience.45 These three features indicate that the public
sphere is not merely a space for debate and discussion between strangers. It is,
rather, a normatively rich concept, which designates a forum where a particular
type of communication takes place between persons who understand their activities
in a special way. The type of deliberation that takes place is not merely orientated
towards public aﬀairs, but is conducted in accordance with egalitarian norms of
freedom and equality. In Bohman’s conceptual framework, this is interpreted as a
commitment on the part of all participants to the non-domination of all. The idea
of a ‘public’ also implies that participants view themselves as having something
politically significant in common, even if this ‘thing-in-common’ is merely their
shared attachment to non-domination or their shared interest in a particular issue
or crisis.
This interpretation of the public sphere reminds us of the magnitude of the task
that Bohman ascribes to global civil society. It is not suﬃcient for civic associations
to aim at stimulating public discussion and debate about global governance within
and across national borders. Neither is it suﬃcient, as Bohman sometimes appears
to suggest, for civil society groups to establish accessible forums, on-line or
otherwise, where such discussion and debate could take place.46 Their aim must
also be to promote a particular type of communication, in which participants
manifest a commitment to norms of non-domination.47 Global civil society must
encourage participants in transnational public spheres to view themselves as a
public. This task is made all the more challenging given that most citizens continue
to identify themselves first and foremost as members of national publics. The
architects of public spheres that cut across national boundaries must, therefore,
contribute to a transformation in the self-understanding of participants and
audiences. The problem is that, in the absence of a sustained analysis of the
internal dynamics of debate in global civil society, advocates of deliberative
global governance cannot provide us with a compelling account of how this
transformation in the values and attachments of citizens can be brought about.
The closest that Bohman comes to providing such an account is his discussion
of ‘minipublics’, randomly selected citizens brought together to discuss particular
45 Bohman, Democracy Across Borders, p. 60.
46 Ibid., pp. 80–1.
47 It might be objected that this commitment to non-domination is too demanding. This may be true,
but it should be remembered that many – if not all – theories that develop a normative framework
for global deliberation or international cooperation require participants to develop ties of mutual
concern and attachment. Habermas, for instance, requires global citizens to recognise the universal
human rights of all. An ethic of ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ must underpin a general willingness to
promote the interests of a ‘cosmopolitan community’, even if this entails going against a narrow
interpretation of the interests of their nation (Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation:
Political Essays, trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 111–2). John Rawls requires that
the populations of well ordered peoples develop ‘mutual concern for each other’s way of life and
culture and [. . .] become willing to make sacrifices for each other’. He thinks that strengthening weak
or non-existent ties of ‘aﬃnity’ between peoples is an urgent challenge if the requisite support for
his ‘duty of assistance’ is to be forthcoming (John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (London: Harvard
University Press, 1999), pp. 112–3). Though ‘non-domination’, ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ and ‘aﬃnity
among peoples’ are radically diﬀerent notions, all these theorists confront an essentially similar
challenge: how to promote a potentially demanding ethos of enlightened mutual concern across
diverse populations. This challenge simply manifests itself in a particularly acute form in Bohman’s
deliberative approach. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.
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issues.48 He describes the convening of such micro publics as part of an iterative
and ongoing process through which transnational publics are forged. ‘Minipublics’,
he says, ‘rely on experimental eﬀorts to convene citizens and create self-consciously
organized publics’.49 In this instance, Bohman quite rightly reminds us that the
opinions and preferences of citizens are not set in stone but are subject to
transformation in and through their participation in public deliberation.50 At the
same time, as valuable as they may be, the ‘institutional experiments’ discussed by
Bohman are unlikely by themselves to forge the large-scale, inclusive and
anonymous public spheres that he identifies as necessary conditions of global
deliberative democracy. First, minipublics are, by their very nature, short-lived and
only incorporate very small numbers of citizens. As Bohman acknowledges, global
civil society, with its diverse range of associations that campaign over a wide range
of issues, remains a key variable in the promotion of a more globally-conscious
public. Second, and more importantly, Bohman’s emphasis on minipublics reflects
a general tendency on the part of deliberative theorists to emphasise political
processes at the expense of political substance.51 The claim that transformations in
value horizons can be brought about in and through participation in political
processes is certainly plausible, but it must be backed up through at least some
exploration of the internal dynamics of these procedures. The capacity of processes
to promote the egalitarian norms constitutive of Bohman’s democratic publics, for
instance, will surely depend on the extent to which at least some participants are
already committed to these norms and able to promote them in and through
political engagement.
Global civil society as an aﬀective arena
In order to shore up the plausibility of their radical ambitions, deliberative
theorists must pay more attention to the content of civil society campaigns and
initiatives. It is necessary to explore whether and how actors in global civil society
contribute to the creation of new publics. In other words, how do civil society
actors go about appealing to and influencing citizens through their campaigns and
activities? In addition, how does debate about internal disagreements reflect back
upon the value horizons and political priorities of global civil society itself?
The aim of raising these questions is not to undermine the promising work
being carried out by deliberative theorists, but to enhance their project by
addressing questions and challenges that are posed by their accounts of global civil
society. Our central argument, then, is that by their own lights deliberative theorists
need to undertake a sustained investigation into the activities of and deliberations
within global civil society. The research that is called for here must focus upon the
48 Archon Fung, ‘Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their
Consequences’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 11:3 (2003), pp. 338–67.
49 Bohman, Democracy Across Borders, p. 88 (our emphasis).
50 See also Daniel Weinstock, ‘Prospects for Transnational Citizenship and Democracy’, Ethics &
International Aﬀairs, 15:2 (2001), pp. 53–66.
51 Similar points about the beneficial consequences of participation on the value horizons of citizens
are advanced in Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics, pp. 57–8 and Cochran, ‘A Democratic Critique
of Cosmopolitan Democracy’, p. 538.
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nature and limits of the various strategies employed by global civil society in
deliberation about global governance. The reflections that we oﬀer in the rest of
this article do not constitute a methodological blueprint for this research, but
rather an attempt to illustrate how it might proceed. To fix ideas, we suggest that,
instead of constructing global civil society only as a deliberative agent, it should
also be construed as an ‘aﬀective arena’. The notion of an aﬀective arena has two
related meanings.
First, it captures the sense in which civil society is a space of debate and
activity. Activists in global civil society discuss issues of globalisation and global
governance, organisational structures, appropriate strategies, and much else about
the politics of resistance, including political orientation, power, and the dangers of
co-optation highlighted by deliberative theorists. Global civil society organisations
and the public spaces that they forge, like the World Social Forum, involve vast
processes of deliberation geared towards deciding who and what issues are
included, how funds are spent and what action might be taken. In describing global
civil society as an ‘arena’, we are suggesting that it is already a type of ‘public’. It
may not qualify as such on the stringent definition preferred by Bohman, given the
diﬃculty of discerning widespread attachment to egalitarian norms among its
participants. It does constitute a public, though, in the important sense that the
actors within it understand themselves as participating within an ongoing
communicative practice. The deliberation instigated by global civil society must, to
be sure, aim to have an impact on the wider world. At the same time, this
deliberation will also aim at negotiating the values and agendas of global civil
society itself, particularly given the pluralism and variety of the actors within it.
The second meaning, which is arguably more important, is that discussions and
activities within global civil society are not limited to reason and contestation, but
also draw on aﬀective modes of expression. One only need consider recent
campaigns, like the aforementioned Make Poverty History, to see how music, film
and celebrity are starting to move beyond mere window dressing to contribute to
the actual stuﬀ of civil society.52 De Goede points to the importance of the
aﬀective qualities of global civil society campaigns and discussions when she argues
that ‘ambiguity, laughter, and making strange can be important political projects
in their own right which may not add up to a revolutionary project of global
change, but which may constitute important transformations of peoples’ experi-
ences’.53 We might also look to the use of music, comedy, art and – as we argue
in the next section – film as important elements in the aﬀective arena of global civil
society. Such forms and qualities are under-theorised by deliberative theorists, yet
they are clearly playing an important role in the campaigns that are carried out
within global civil society.54
Of particular importance is De Goede’s reference to the capacity of these
techniques to instigate ‘transformations of peoples’ experiences’. In focusing on the
use of aﬀective modes of expression, we gain deeper insight into the capacity of
global civil society not merely to challenge existing value preferences of global
52 Brassett, ‘Cosmopolitanism vs. Terrorism?’, pp. 121–47.
53 De Goede, ‘Carnival of Money’, p. 381.
54 The role of aﬀective modes of communication in deliberative democracy, at least in domestic
contexts, has been extensively explored by Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 2.
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audiences, but to promote and forge new attachments and identities. Aﬀective
modes of expression aim at an emotional as well as a rational response; to use
popular parlance, they appeal to the heart as well as the mind. In this respect,
aﬀective communication is perhaps better compared to certain types of political
protest or even artistic expression. A protest or a work of art can, and often does,
aim to communicate a clear message, in a similar fashion to a social movement or
politician who advances an argument in the public sphere. At the same time, there
is clearly another, arguably richer, communicative dynamic at work in protest or
art, insofar as it aims to stimulate an emotional or aﬀective response in its
audience. An analysis of the complexity of the communicative utterances projected
into the world by actors in global civil society, which focuses on their educative and
sentimental content, may help us to better understand how civil society can
perform the functions ascribed to it by deliberative theorists. In particular, it may
help us to appreciate how global civil society might, after all, play an important
role in the creation of new publics. It may also cast light on the means through
which actors in the aﬀective arena reflect upon disagreements within global civil
society itself.
3. Film and global civil society
One of the most noticeable shifts in the nature of global civil society campaigning
in recent years has been the adoption of film. The rise of NGO campaign films is
a notable feature of campaign websites and has started to form a greater part of
intra-civil society communication. Films are produced by civil society actors for
mass audiences, but are also increasingly used as part of education and debate
within social forums.55 Clearly, the nature of film means that it is far more geared
towards generating opinion and reflection than political decisions. But we see this
as a potential resource for enriching the substance of deliberative approaches to
global governance. Indeed, one of the central aims of our analysis is to shift
attention away from the ‘decision’ and back to nature of deliberation itself. By
doing this we hope to suggest that the contested nature of civil society debates is
itself an important part of the politics of deliberative global governance.
Within what we term the ‘aﬀective arena’ of global civil society, film can be at
once both a motive force – ‘to move people to arms’ – and a reflective/reflexive
medium, capable of forcing people to question their most foundational assump-
tions. These points can be illustrated via a discussion of the use of film in general
and the representation of trade politics through film in particular. The use of film
is presented here as a ‘case study’ of the ways in which groups in global civil
society appeal to, or even create, transnational communities of interest through
deliberative and aﬀective modes of expression. Building on the discussion above,
we suggest that the evidence thus far does not point to the emergence of the kind
of thick socio-egalitarian public spheres hoped for by deliberative theorists. Rather,
our investigation expresses the limits – both ontological and ethical – which
deliberative global governance must address.
55 For instance, as well as playing a number of his films, the 2004 London Social Forum gave a
platform to Ken Loach for discussion for his work and political views.
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Campaign adverts
Perhaps the most obvious sense in which global civil society has experienced a turn
to film is in the use of ‘campaign adverts’. These are generally short, relatively low
budget film clips that identify a major issue area or problem and posit a particular
campaign as the ready solution to these problems. In line with much of what
Bohman and Dryzek argue, such films are capable of subjecting international
institutions to a publicity of reasons that could perhaps democratise the discourses
of global governance. For instance, the British NGO War on Want regularly
condenses its campaign messages into short 5–10 minute films which can be viewed
for free at its website and which campaigners often carry to forums and meetings.56
In particular, in a campaign video on the WTO, War on Want suggests that despite
liberal rhetoric free trade policies have actually led to the loss of jobs, widespread
internal migration from agricultural to urban areas, and the creation of poverty.57
In this way, campaign adverts probably fit neatly within the schematic sketched
in previous sections about how global civil society can partake in deliberative
global governance. Perhaps oversimplifying, Bohman’s standard for the creation of
democratic public spheres is probably met by the interactions between say, Make
Poverty History and the G8, where media message and films played no small
part.58 In a similar fashion, Dryzek’s notion of ‘democratising a discourse’ can be
adequately stretched to meet the kinds of roles and services that campaign adverts
provide. Due to the reduced cost of making films and distributing them via the
internet or social forums, it is quite possible for such campaign adverts to serve the
deliberative function of educating, and provoking democratic deliberation over
particular issues. Campaign adverts can identify an issue area which might be a
suitable basis for forming a public around, such as climate change, poverty, animal
cruelty, or sweatshops. In addition, campaign adverts can provide an interesting,
if somewhat short, gamut of reasons for engaging with, deliberating about and
perhaps reforming an aspect of global governance.
It is perhaps unlikely that deliberative theorists would want to attach too much
significance to these forms. In the case of charities, campaign adverts are most
famously (perhaps infamously?) associated with a mass market television approach
which commonly depict helpless, starving, Africans, (usually women and/or women
with children).59 Such campaign adverts have helped charities and other NGOs to
deal with the twin objectives of gaining funds and ‘spreading the word’, but for
some within civil society they have come at the expense of actually including those
whom the charities claim to speak for. For instance, in opposition to the perceived
elitism of the Make Poverty History Campaign, a coalition of Southern grass-roots
organisations formed a counter campaign called ‘Not About Us Without Us’.60 In
this instance, the thicker egalitarian values sought by theorists like Bohman
arguably emerged out of a contest within and amongst global civil society activists.
56 {http://www.waronwant.org/Videos+12493.twl}.
57 {http://www.waronwant.org/War+on+Want%27s+WTO+Film+12336.twl}.
58 Brassett, ‘Cosmopolitanism vs. Terrorism?’, pp. 121–47.
59 For a powerful discussion of these kinds of narrative see J. Edkins, Whose Hunger? Concepts of
Famine, Practices of Aid (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
60 John Gaventa with Marj Mayo, ‘Not about us without us’: Linking Local and Global citizen
Advocacy’, A research proposal. Working Group on citizenship and Engagement in a Globalised
World January 2006).
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Activists associated with Make Poverty History clearly focused, at least in part, on
influencing decision-making (the G8), whereas their ‘opponents’ interrogated the
discursive methods through which these political aims were pursued.
User-generated film
The rise of user generated film is perhaps more likely to speak to the deliberative
values of inclusion and recognition. User generated film works on the straightfor-
ward principle that individuals are best placed to document their experiences and
life chances/constraints. Indeed, certain civil society operations describe this type of
film making as ‘participatory video’.
A key possibility presented by user generated film is a potential link to
grassroots. In a now famous example, Indymedia provides a framework where
anyone, anywhere in the world, can upload their own film commentaries on
political events under the slogan, ‘don’t hate the media, become the media’.61 The
aim of indymedia is to provide a web forum where activists could circumvent what
they regarded as the one-sided reporting of anti-globalisation protests. Instead of
the common narrative of protests – protestors throwing missiles and the police
responding with ‘reasonable force’ – films document peaceful demonstrations
which were then broken up by aggressive police actions.
Sometimes, the organisation of participatory video involves a ‘top-down’
promotion of ‘bottom-up’ practices. In line with deliberative themes of inclusion
and recognition, participatory video often involves the practice of giving video
cameras to marginalised groups like the urban poor, or people suﬀering with HIV,
for instance, so that they can tell their own stories about their lived experiences.62
Participatory video is seen as crucial aspect of including the dispossessed and the
voiceless in the practice and deliberative process of deciding upon developmental
goals and objectives. As Pat Norrish suggests:
As development thinking has shifted towards sustainability and participation, there have
been remarkable and rapid developments in computing and communication technologies
which oﬀer exciting possibilities for rural communities to move into the information age.
For this to happen there needs to be a concerted, multisectoral approach to information
technology with a focus on rural populations as communicators and contributors to
information and knowledge, rather than passive consumers [. . .]63
In a similar vein, the World Bank has championed the benefits of participatory film
making as a means of learning something about the people who many in global
civil society claim to speak for, arguing that:
61 As Andre Spicer recounts: ‘Indy media is a global online activist media network. It is made up of
over 150 autonomous Indymedia collectives around the world. Each collective typically operates a
website which allows anyone to upload new stories and comment items for public viewing. The news
which tends to appear on an Indymedia site has a definite orientation towards issues that concern
progressive activists.’ (Unpublished Working paper).
62 R. Bleiker and A. Kay, ‘Representing HIV/AIDS in Africa: Pluralist Photography and Local
Empowerment’, in International Studies Quarterly, 51:1 (2007), pp. 139–63.
63 Pat Norrish, The First Mile of Connectivity: Advancing telecommunications for rural development
through participatory communication, {http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0295e/x0295e00.htm}.
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Indigenous knowledge and local initiatives are usually documented and disseminated by
outsiders, who make their own interpretations in the process. Participatory Video (PV)
provides an opportunity for rural people to document their own knowledge and experiences
and to express their wants and hopes from their own perspectives.64
Of course, it would be easy to over sell this emergent form. Participatory video
relies on the extension of information technology to poor communities often with
a highly focused set of objectives, that is, to create economic growth. As Garrett
Brown discusses in his contribution to this volume, the principle of multi-
sectoralism is often tarnished by the way in which the initial debate is set up and
how certain and particular sectors are able to dominate proceedings.65 An
important issue is whether user generated film could explore the possibility of some
form of hybrid between placing a radical emphasis on autonomy, such that film
subjects are chosen by film makers, and the kind of funded, and highly focused,
emphasis on development issues favoured by the World Bank, which perhaps
privileges the economic dimensions of people’s lives. However, the successful
inclusion of the subjects of development in at least the deliberations over how
development should proceed is surely an important spur for a deliberative
approach to global governance.
Ethical documentaries
Finally, there has been a recent growth in the production of ‘ethical’ films and
documentaries. Sometimes these are films funded by ethical entrepreneurs, such as
Black Gold; others are films made with an ethical objective in mind. Films like Life
and Debt and Darwin’s Nightmare, for instance, each tap into an important critical
issue within the discussion of globalisation that is both interesting for, and
arguably constitutive of, global civil society. For instance, An Inconvenient Truth
was instrumental in the generation of public energy towards the ‘Live Earth’
campaign.
A key example of this type of film is Black Gold, a documentary about the
coﬀee industry with the subtitle ‘wake up and smell the coﬀee’. Black Gold occupies
a space on a spectrum between film and global civil society. The narrative of Black
Gold strongly endorses fair trade as a route beyond the pathologies of the Coﬀee
Market. The film presents a stark image of a world coﬀee price predominantly
governed by the New York Coﬀee Exchange which agrees a price to trade beans
from developing country suppliers to developed world coﬀee processors. Of course
the steps in the supply chain are far more complex. On the one hand, developing
country suppliers buy from a large number of small farmers at a lower price even
that the New York Coﬀee Exchange. On the other hand, the developed country
suppliers can sell on to supermarkets and coﬀee shops at a much higher price. The
resultant diﬀerential means that the price paid for one cup of coﬀee in Starbucks
is roughly the price paid to farmers for two sacks of coﬀee.
In this context, the film tells a sympathetic narrative of how one developing
country supplier has engaged in fair trade deals to guarantee a better price to
64 IKNotes, World Bank, No 71, {www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/default.htm}.
65 Garrett Brown, ‘Safeguarding deliberative global governance: the case of The Global Fund to Fight
Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria’.
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farmers. Black Gold is therefore both a serious cinematic engagement with the issue
of trade and a political endorsement of the Fair Trade campaign/movement/
business. While such films are obviously important for spreading awareness about
unfair trade practices and educating a broader public about the possibilities of fair
trade practices, there is perhaps a sense in which Black Gold misses the possibility
of deeper critique of trade. As a counterpoint, Darwin’s Nightmare presents a root
and branch deconstruction of the trade relation as it was felt in Tanzania. This film
tells a far darker story of how a society can become structured around a single
export product – the Nile Perch – fished and processed for trade to European
markets. Because of the cash value of the Nile Perch, nearly all areas of society
around Lake Victoria are either involved in the industry or parasitic upon it;
including begging, prostitution, and the bastard industry of fish heads and fish
bones for local people (that is, Tanzanians sell the meat and buy the bones).
The importance of Darwin’s Nightmare is that it shows how the structure of the
trade relation, emphatically endorsed by the European Commission as a route to
development, is actually capable of disarticulating a community. The concentration
of capital and profit draws male farmers from the rural areas to fish, while women
often end up with little choice but prostitution. Moreover, the film makers
structure their narrative around the transport planes which enter and leave
everyday. They come in empty and leave full of fish. The Russian pilots are
frequent and sometimes violent customers for the prostitutes and eventually
disclose some of their other trade jobs, the principal among which is the import of
arms. One pilot tells of how he once realised that at Christmas he was taking fish
to the tables of children in Europe and guns to the child soldiers of Africa.
As an element within global civil society the film performs many, often
ambiguous functions. On the one hand there is clearly an educative dimension to
Darwin’s Nightmare. In this way, film might provide an important site of
‘ontological deliberation’ over global governance. Against the ‘big questions’ of
deliberative global governance, which focus on how global civil society can aﬀect
the WTO, for instance, this type of narrative might actually undermine the ethical
basis of such a view, by levelling a foundational critique of global trade, per se.
Indeed, there is something quite unnerving about the deliberative view that the
inclusion of more voices in decision making can actually solve the large problem
of what counts as non-domination on a global scale. How can democratising the
WTO address the issue of the structural inequalities of the global trade relation?
How can it address the issue of the relationship between global trade and
environmental degradation? Perhaps it can, but we would require a far more
explicit engagement with such fundamental dilemmas. On the other hand, the film
had a paradoxical impact: French supermarkets refused to continue stocking the
Nile Perch and the Tanzanian government began a crackdown on anyone who was
involved with the film.66 Thus, a radical intervention had a negative, though
unintended consequence.
In this way, the move to film has yielded not only a technical complement to
the subject of deliberation within the arena of global civil society but also a set of
substantive issues relating to the ethical and political priorities of deliberative
global governance. This might equally occur via a greater engagement with social
66 See {http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/17/film.filmnews}.
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forum discussions and the protracted debates between the ‘horizontals’ and the
‘verticals’ (or the grassroots networks and the NGO’s) over the proper organisation
of the World Social Forum. But the point would remain the same: fundamental
ontological and ethical disagreement about the shape and practice of global
governance will not be overcome via pluralism alone. The aim of our argument, as
we have emphasised, is not to reject deliberative accounts of global civil society.
Our concern, rather, is to draw out, in a constructive fashion, what we see as
serious empirical and political diﬃculties in these accounts. An example of these
diﬃculties, neatly illustrated by our discussion of Darwin’s Nightmare, is that
incorporating a plurality of perspectives in global governance may not, in and of
itself, promote the normative values that animate deliberative theories of global
governance.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our argument has traced certain motifs in deliberative accounts of
global civil society. The temptation to conceptualise global civil society as a
deliberative agent has been criticised and an alternative analysis of it as an aﬀective
arena has been introduced. On the one hand, our aim has been to nudge the study
of deliberative global governance down the path of generating richer and more
variegated empirical analyses of the actual content of deliberation within global
civil society. On the other hand, our study of film has raised tough questions about
the deliberative politics of global civil society. How do we deliberate with those
who may, quite reasonably, reject the terms, content and site of deliberation at the
global level? In line with others, we fear that a celebration of pluralism within
deliberative theories of global governance can at times lead to an eﬀacement of the
diﬃcult political questions about power and domination articulated by radical
voices within global civil society. Deliberative theory may need to take more notice
of the actual deliberations within civil society, in the coming years, if it is to oﬀer
a more reflexive account of the ethical reform of global governance to come.
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